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Abstract People seem to perceive and locate pains in bodily locations, but also
seem to conceive of pains as mental states that can be introspected. However, pains
cannot be both bodily and mental, at least according to most conceptions of these
two categories: mental states are not the kind of entities that inhabit body parts. How
are we to resolve this paradox of pain (Aydede in Pain: new papers on its nature and
the methodology of its study. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006a; Hill in Pain: new
papers on its nature and the methodology of its study. MIT Press, Cambridge,
2006)? In this paper, I put forward what I call the ‘Developmental Challenge’,
tackling the second pillar of this paradox, i.e. the introspectionist (or mental-state)
view of pain according to which (A) genuine pain reports are introspective reports.
This view forms an inconsistent triad with two other widely held positions:
(B) young children make genuine pain reports, and (C) young children do not make
introspective reports. After introducing the paradox and the introspectionist view of
pain in part 1, I present the developmental challenge, and defend both (B) and (C). I
conclude that the inconsistent triad can only be resolved by reconsidering the
introspectionist view of pain. In discussing three potential factors that lead to the
puzzling intricacies of our concept of pain, I argue that the concept of pain might
not be paradoxical after all.
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1 The Paradox of Pain and the Introspectionist View
During the last decade, philosophers working on the topic of pain have highlighted a
serious tension between the bodily and mental aspects of pain, which has come to be
known as the paradox of pain (Aydede 2006a; Hill 2006). On the one hand, pain
reports reveal that people locate pains in body parts, such as fingers or ankles. On
the other hand, people seem to conceive of pains as mental states: An analysis of our
common-sense conception of pain reveals that people largely think of pains as
mental entities (Aydede 2006a). Hasty attempts to overturn one of the two pillars of
this paradox fail. People’s pain reports are not just linguistic expressions with a
semantics that is independent of the phenomenal character of experiences of pain:
People locate pains in toes and elbows because this is where they feel pains to be.
Rejecting the view that pains are mental states appears equally implausible. Pains
seem to have all the characteristics typical of mental states: pains are considered to
be private, subjective states that require an owner and cannot be hallucinated.
Both pillars of the paradox seem to be unshakable to the extent that some
philosophers are prepared to bite the bullet and accept the conclusion of the
paradox, thereby challenging the standard division of mind and body, e.g. Hyman
(2003) argues that pains are both sensations of sentient beings and located where we
feel them to be. However, people do not locate thoughts and desires, visual and
auditory experiences, emotions and imaginations, in extra-mental space. Thus, the
paradox seems to arise solely for bodily sensations of which pain is the most
prominent example. It is arguably the restricted domain of the paradox that
motivates philosophers to reject the anti-Cartesian conclusion of the paradox and to
seek a less revolutionary solution to it.
One of those solutions has been put forward by Hill, who proposes an
eliminativist conclusion: ‘‘We can remove the paradox of pain by replacing the
concept (of pain) with two new ones’’ (2009, p. 189). Whereas one of these concepts
would track disturbances in the body, reflecting the reported location of pains in the
body, the other would refer to feelings of pain and satisfy the mental aspect of our
concept of pain. Other philosophers have been less convinced that the mental aspect
of pain is a dominant strand in our common-sense understanding of pain, and argue
in favor of a purely perceptual view, which takes pains to be bodily states that we
perceive when we feel pains. Whereas Sytsma (2010) shows that people do not tend
to consider pains to be private in the case of conjoined twins, Reuter (2011) uses
web-statistical data on the occurrences of the phrases ‘feeling pain’ and ‘having
pain’ to argue for a distinction between the appearance and reality of pain, thereby
putting into doubt the proclaimed subjectivity of pains.
It is far more common among both scientists and philosophers, however, to
embrace the view that pains are mental states and that people think of pains as
mental states. The International Association for the Study of Pain defines pain as an
unpleasant emotional and sensory experience that is associated with actual or
potential tissue damage, and most scientists describe pains in accordance with the
IASP definition. Similarly, philosophers who work on theories of introspection and
self-knowledge take people’s awareness of pain to be a classic example of
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introspective awareness, i.e. awareness of a mental state. The term awareness,
however, is ambiguous and can be understood in a conceptual and non-conceptual
way. It has been acknowledged that the mere feeling of pain is not sufficient for
introspective knowledge of pain, e.g. Seager argues that
feeling a pain does not by itself constitute any kind of introspective
knowledge. […] To suppose otherwise would entail crediting all creatures
who can feel pain with introspective knowledge about their own minds and
while cats, for example, can surely feel pain they do not, I think, engage in
introspection. (2000, p. 53)
Seager then identifies what he takes to be the missing ingredient for the
attribution of introspective knowledge of one’s pain: ‘‘Introspective knowledge of,
for example, our own pains requires consciousness of the pain, plus the knowledge
that this is a pain, or that I am in a state that hurts or something along these lines.’’
(2000, p. 62, my italics). According to Seager, whenever people feel a pain and
report that they have a pain based on their feeling the pain, they have introspective
knowledge of their pain. The main reason for why philosophers hold that these pain
reports are indeed introspective reports is that people seem to consider pains to be
(i) private, (ii) subjective states that require an owner, and (iii) cannot be
hallucinated. These three characteristics are often summarized (see e.g. Dretske
2006; Kripke 1980; McGinn 1982) by the claim that it is impossible to distinguish
the appearance from the reality of pain. According to this claim, the conceptual role
of pain seems to be determined by the following two conditionals:
(Subjectivity of Pain) If a person has a pain, then the person feels a pain.
(No Hallucination) If a person feels a pain, then the person has a pain.
Regarding the subjectivity of pains, it is argued that it would be absurd for people
to believe that pains are lingering in their body without them being aware of them,
e.g. Aydede states: ‘‘That pain is a subjective experience seems to be a truism.’’
(2009) And Lewis writes: ‘‘Pain is a feeling. Surely that is uncontroversial.’’ (1980,
p. 222) Equally implausible seems to be the suggestion that people can feel a pain
without there really being any pain, e.g. Block asserts that ‘‘we do not acknowledge
pain hallucinations, (i.e.) cases where it seems that I have a pain but in fact there is
no pain’’ (2006, p. 138). Not all philosophers, however, agree that the common-
sense conception of pain rules out unfelt pains and pain hallucinations.1 The
putative lack of an appearance-reality distinction for pains contrasts with our
understanding of ordinary objects of perception. Not only do people believe that
objects of perception continue to exist without being perceived, they also hold that it
1 As for the subjectivity of pains, several counterexamples can be listed: (i) people sometimes say that
pains wake them up, suggesting that they can exist unfelt; (ii) people also state that they feel the same
pain again; (iii) it seems that we can be distracted from pains such that they exist without being felt, e.g.
Lycan (2004, p. 106) has claimed that ‘‘given a mild pain that I have, I may be only very dimly and
peripherally aware of it (assuming I am aware of it at all).’’ Referred pains and phantom-limb pains have
been discussed (Pitcher 1970) as instances in which people seem to be subject to pain illusions and pain
hallucinations. Reuter et al. (2014) have presented empirical evidence showing that a majority of the
participants in their studies accept the existence of pain hallucinations and pain illusions.
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is possible to hallucinate perceptual objects, e.g. people may genuinely report scents
of burned toast and the beating of drums when they are not really perceived. From
these considerations regarding the awareness of pain we can state what I hereafter
call the introspectionist view of pain:
(A) Genuine pain reports are introspective reports.
This statement should be read as a universally quantified statement, i.e. that all
genuine pain reports are introspective reports. In using the term genuine pain reports
I mean pain reports that are (i) made when a person really does have a pain, and (ii)
are based on the feeling of the pain. Unfortunately, very few scholars discuss how
the introspectionist view of pain can be squared with the first pillar of the paradox of
pain, i.e. that people locate pains in body parts. Representationalists like Tye (2006)
have developed an interesting solution to the paradox which comes, however, at a
significant cost. Accordingly, experiences of pain represent bodily disorders in
bodily locations. In order to explain why people locate pains in body parts, Tye
states:
The term pain in one usage, applies to the experience; in another, it applies to
the quality represented, insofar as (and only insofar as) it is within the content
of a pain experience. (Tye 2006, p. 101, my italics).
Aydede discusses a similar suggestion on behalf of the representationalist:
Upon reflection, however, we may realize that in uttering I feel a sharp pain in
the back of my right hand, I actually attribute an intentional feeling state to
myself which in turn attributes a physical disturbance to my hand. The
colloquial ways of speaking just jumble the pain with the disturbance, and thus
confuse and mislead us. (Aydede 2009).
Thus, representationalists reject the view that pains are literally located in body
parts. In order to explain why people apparently report pains to be in body parts,
Tye maintains that when people are aware of a pain experience, they may label the
content of such an experience as pain despite the fact that pains are experiences that
actually represent bodily disorders. Aydede suggests that one might consider the
semantics of pain expressions to be confused and that upon reflection we can realize
that we merely attribute disorders to bodily locations. The concept of pain,
therefore, stands in stark contrast to our concept of color. Whereas the term ‘color’
refers to properties of extra-mental objects, our concept of pain refers to the
experience of pain, and not to disorders in body parts.
While various objections2 have been raised against these suggestions—most
notably by Aydede—there is a more general problem for anyone holding the view
2 The suggestions offered by Aydede and Tye raise two well-known problems. First, people do not seem
to be aware of either being confused (Aydede) or that the term pain has double duty (Tye). Thus, the
proposal to solve the paradox immediately leads to a further riddle: how can people be either confused or
ignorant about one of the most frequently applied concepts they possess. Second, Aydede raises the
problem of focus. He states that ‘‘the typical result of a perceptual process is bringing the perceived object
under a perceptual concept’’ (Aydede 2009). Although people perceive bodily disorders by undergoing
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that pain reports are introspective. Both Aydede and Tye maintain that pain reports
are introspective reports even if the term ‘pain’ sometimes refers to the quality of
the bodily disturbance in a non-mental location. They primarily do so because they
believe that the common-sense conception regards pains to be private, subjective
states that cannot be hallucinated. Hence, the criteria for why pain reports are
classified as introspective continue to hold: A ‘‘pain report is an introspective report
from the very beginning, hence not a perceptual report’’ (Aydede 2006b, p. 134).
Against the position that pain reports are always introspective (from the very
beginning), I will now present what I call the ‘Developmental Challenge’, which
will be presented in form of an inconsistent triad. The purpose of this challenge will
not be merely negative, however. I believe that raising this challenge directs much
needed attention to the question of how the paradox is supposed to arise in the first
place. In the last section I will therefore highlight the factors that I believe lead to
the puzzling intricacies of our concept of pain.
2 The Inconsistent Triad of Pain
The introspectionist position (A) is confronted by an inconsistent triad made up of
the following three propositions:
(A) Genuine pain reports are introspective reports.
(B) Young children3 make genuine pain reports.
(C) Young children do not make introspective reports.
These three claims are conjointly inconsistent: (A) and (B) yield ‘Young children
make introspective reports’, which directly contradicts (C). Thus, at least one of the
three propositions must be false to avoid endorsing an inconsistent position. Before I
discuss possible ways for rejecting claims (B) and (C) in greater detail in the next
section, let me first show why (B) and (C) are widely held claims.
Infant studies show that neonates have a complex response pattern to pain—
including facial and other behavioral expressions—before learned response
mechanisms are acquired (Grunau and Craig 1987). Around the age of
12–17 months, small children express their pains by repetitive sounds like ‘ow–
ow’. During the subsequent stage—between 18 and 24 months—various pain-
referring words (e.g. ‘pain’, ‘sore’, ‘ache’) enter into children’s vocabulary and
children start to describe the location of their pains (Franck et al. 2010; Stanford
et al. 2005). In an extensive study involving 1716 parents, Franck et al. (2010)
determined that by the age of around 3 years, children’s expressive ability includes
complex structures, e.g. ‘I have an ow’ and descriptive words, e.g. ‘stubbed’
Footnote 2 continued
pain experiences, they do not, however, report the perceived object, i.e. the bodily disorder, but rather the
pain experience itself. Thus, pain reports are highly idiosyncratic in that people use a perceptual process
to make an introspective claim about a mental state.
3 In this essay I take young children to be between 2 and 4 years old.
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indicating a causal understanding of the origins of pain. Thus, not only are most
3-year old children capable of feeling pain, they are also capable of correctly
reporting that parts of their body are painful. Given this data, it seems therefore
plausible to conclude that (B) of the inconsistent triad is true. In the next section I
will analyze various suggestions on how to rebut proposition (B) in spite of the
empirical evidence.
It is also widely accepted that a 3-year-old child is not able to make introspective
reports yet (Flavell et al. 1990; Fabricius and Weimer 2010). There are several
standardized tasks, e.g. false-belief tasks, appearance-reality tasks, that are often
used in order to probe children’s conceptual abilities. To fail these tasks is usually
interpreted as a sign of lacking an explicit theory of mind, i.e. the ability to refer to
and reason about mental states. These tasks demonstrate that most children
explicitly attribute beliefs and start to distinguish appearance from reality when they
are between three-and-a-half and 5 years old.4 From 5 years onwards, a majority of
children manage to correctly distinguish true from apparent identities if questions
about the appearance and reality of objects and properties are asked in a child-
friendly manner. In some non-industrialized non-Western cultures, the age at which
children pass these tasks may be much higher, e.g. most 8-years-old Junı´n Quechua
children in Peru were not able to respond to questions in a standard false-belief task
setting correctly (Vinden 1996). During the last decade, so-called implicit false
belief tasks have been conducted and interpreted to show that children may possess
a theory of mind earlier than so far maintained, e.g. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005),
Samson and Apperly (2010). How to correctly interpret these experiments is a
matter of controversy. As I am concerned with introspective reports only, which
require an explicit reference to mental states, these debates affect the current
discussion only peripherally. It seems therefore that developmental studies
regarding children’s ability to pass explicit false-belief and appearance-reality
tasks, show that young children do not yet make introspective statements.
Consequently, (C) of the inconsistent triad also seems to be true.
Let us summarize our findings so far before we delve into a more thorough
discussion: First, I have argued that pain reports are considered to be introspective
because people think and talk about pains as private, subjective states that cannot be
hallucinated. Second, empirical studies show that young children make pain reports.
Thirdly, a large majority of the participants in this debate, including both
philosophers and psychologists, agree that in order to be capable of making
introspective statements about one’s sensory experiences, it is necessary to be able
to distinguish the appearance from the reality of an object or an object’s property
(Dretske 1995; Gopnik and Astington 1988; Taylor and Flavell 1984; Tye 1995).
4 The appearance-reality distinction plays a central part in this essay in two distinct but closely related
ways. First, the impossibility to draw an appearance-reality distinction about x is taken to be a sufficient
condition for categorizing x as a mental state. Hence, pains are often considered to be mental states
because of the putative impossibility to draw an appearance-reality distinction for pains (Aydede 2006a;
Dretske 2006; Hill 2006). Second, the inability of a person to make an appearance-reality distinction is
taken to be a sufficient condition for denying that this person is in possession of a theory of mind in
regards to sensory states. Hence, failing appearance-reality tasks, is interpreted by many philosophers and
psychologists (Baron-Cohen 1989; Carruthers 1996; Nichols and Stich 2003; Taylor and Flavell 1984) to
mean that the person is not yet able to refer to sensory states of herself or others.
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However, if children have not yet developed an understanding of these notions, then
how can children’s pain reports be classified as introspective? We can therefore
challenge the second pillar of the paradox of pain, i.e. the introspectionist position,
by joining these three claims which form the inconsistent triad that I have already
stated above:
(A) Genuine pain reports are introspective reports.
(B) Young children make genuine pain reports.
(C) Young children do not make introspective reports.
It is obvious that it is impossible to consistently entertain all three propositions
(A), (B) or (C). How can we respond to this challenge?
3 Responding to the Developmental Challenge
The introduction of the inconsistent triad and the motivation of its propositions in
the last section suggest that the paradoxical nature of pain may not arise for younger
children. Hence, it seems that those who would like to uphold the introspectionist
view about people’s awareness of pain need to respond to the developmental
challenge by either revising or restricting the introspectionist view of pain, or by
rejecting one of the additional propositions of the inconsistent triad. This section
analyzes in greater detail whether it is plausible to reject or at least doubt either
(B) or (C).
1. Rejecting (B): It is not the case (or has not yet been conclusively shown) that
young children make genuine pain reports.
2. Rejecting (C): It is not the case (or has not yet been conclusively shown) that
young children do not make introspective reports.
3.1 Do Young Children Report Pains?
The simplest way to reject the claim that young children make genuine pain reports
is to deny that children actually experience what we call ‘pains’. However, this is
merely a theoretical possibility. This response amounts to stating that children do
not feel pains but something else, e.g. schpains. However, there is neither
neurophysiological nor behavioral evidence for this proposal. Instead, ‘‘the afferent
nociceptive system is completely developed by 29 weeks gestation’’ (Hardcastle
2001, p. 197). Although it is true that children’s expressive pain-behavior can be
quite different from the behavior of adults—mostly because many adults do not
want to be perceived as suffering—the basic neurophysiological and behavioral
responses are very much the same (Mathew and Mathew 2003; Rushforth and
Levene 1994). Young children and adults show the same responses in terms of
withdrawal, avoidance, protection, and instinctive expressive behavior. Thus, the
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empirical results on pain perception in infants make it very unlikely that children’s
pain experiences are different from those of adults.
A more promising move for rejecting claim (B) is to argue that small children do
not yet have the concept of pain. Accordingly, children do not yet report pains
despite them seemingly being able to successfully communicate to other people that
something is wrong with their body based on their bodily sensations. Whether this
objection can succeed largely depends on the possession conditions for the concept
pain. Unfortunately, stating the possession conditions for concepts is notoriously
difficult. However, we can cut this discussion somewhat short by highlighting that
for the purpose of our debate, we are interested in situations in which a pain report is
made because a pain was recognized. In these situations, we can therefore assume
that the concept pain is a recognitional concept. This assumption seems to be shared
by most protagonists of the debate (Tye 2006; Aydede 2006a; Hill 2006). Fodor
argues that a concept is recognitional if ‘‘among its possession conditions is the
ability to recognize at least some things that fall under the concept as things that fall
under the concept’’ (1998, p. 1). A purely recognitional concept of pain is a
recognitional concept that has no other possession conditions but dispositions for
recognizing instances of pain. If the concept pain is a purely recognitional concept,
then children possess the concept pain if they correctly recognize pains in body
parts, an ability that we have seen can be attributed to almost all 3-year olds. Thus,
under a purely recognitional reading of the concept pain, (B) holds. It is of course
possible that people recognize pains through an introspective process. This
possibility will be considered in the next section. For now, we are only concerned
with whether it is at all plausible to deny that young children make genuine pain
reports.
It might be argued that the concept pain is not a purely recognitional concept.
Instead, the concept of pain may have among its possession conditions non-
recognitional features. Such a condition could be, e.g. that a person possesses the
concept pain only if that person believes that pains cannot exist without being felt.
Hill (2006) adopts such a position. He states among other conditions that in order to
possess the concept of pain one must be disposed to reject the proposition that there
is a pain (in one’s ankle), unless one feels a pain (in one’s ankle).5 There are three
reasons why I believe such additional possession conditions should be rejected.
First, if Hill is correct, then a child who claims that there is a pain in her ankle, but
that she can only feel it sometimes, would not possess the concept of pain. This
conclusion seems to be counterintuitive, especially if the child has learned to
identify and locate pains correctly when they occur, and hence is successful in
communicating with adults whether or not she has a pain. Second, experiments have
shown (e.g. Sytsma 2010; Reuter 2011; Reuter et al. 2014) that many adults do not
consider pains to be subjective and that pains can actually be hallucinated. It is one
thing to respond to these results by pointing out that some people may make wrong
inferences regarding their own or other people’s pains. However, if Hill is correct,
then we would need to deny that these people actually possess the concept of pain,
5 Hill’s exact wording is that ‘‘in order to possess the concept of pain one must be disposed to reject the
proposition that one is in pain, unless one has a P-representation.’’ (2006, p. 82).
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which seems too strong a claim. It seems to be more plausible to acknowledge that
these people do possess the concept of pain, but draw different inferences about
their pains than other people.
Third, rejecting a non-introspective account by holding that the subjectivity and
privacy condition are necessary possession conditions of the concept pain, and that
young children do not therefore possess the concept of pain, begs the question
against a non-introspective account if no independent motivation for these
possession conditions is presented. However, it is very unlikely that the
incorporation of the privacy and subjectivity condition into the possession
conditions of the concept pain can be argued for on independent grounds.
Philosophers do not present any independent evidence for the claim that pains are
mental states other than referring to our common-sense understanding of pain:
That pains are necessarily private and necessarily owned is part of our folk
conception of pain and it requires explanation. The obvious explanation is that
pain is a feeling or an experience of a certain sort. [… This] is part of our
commonsense conception. (Tye 2006, p. 100, my italics)
[According to the] common-sense conception of pain […] pains are sensations
with essential privacy, subjectivity, self-intimation, and incorrigibility.
(Aydede 2009, my italics)
The view that pains are considered to be mental states stands and falls with our
common-sense conception of pain, and does not seem to be motivated indepen-
dently. Hence, denying children the possession of the concept pain, not only seems
to be a counterintuitive move, given that children successfully communicate the
existence of pains, it also begs the question against the possibility of a non-
introspective view of pain.
3.2 Do Young Children Conceive of Pains as Mental States?
Another way to dismiss the developmental challenge I have raised against the
existence of the paradox of pain in general, and the introspectionist view in
particular, would be to deny (C), i.e. deny that young children do not make
introspective reports. In Sect. 2, I provided initial reasons for endorsing (C): Studies
by Flavell et al. (1990) and Fabricius and Weimer (2010) show that young children
do not pass appearance-reality tasks, and hence cannot yet be granted with the
possession of an explicit theory of mind. Extrapolating from their data, it seems
reasonable to suppose that this inability to make introspective reports also holds for
pains. However, the psychological evidence does not show that young children
don’t make introspective reports about pains but that they don’t do so only about
their sensory states. Thus, it might be argued that, in contrast to sensory states,
young children apply mental concepts to pain, and thus conceive of pains as mental
states. According to this view, whereas 3–4-year old children do not pass
appearance-reality tasks for sensory experiences, they find it easy to do so when it
comes to pains. This position would be itself a fascinating consequence of our
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discussion: So far, no one seems to have argued that pains are the first mental states
that children are conceptually aware of.
But what would it mean to pass an appearance-reality task when it comes to
pains? In appearance-reality tasks, children are usually tested on their ability to
distinguish the appearance of objects from the real nature of those objects.
According to representationalist accounts of perception, this amounts to distin-
guishing what is represented from what really is the case, e.g. the represented
reddish color of a toy car behind a red filter from its real color white. While the
introspectionist claims that the appearance-reality distinction does not apply to pains
themselves, we have seen that they attempt to dissolve the paradox of pain by
distinguishing pains from what pains represent, i.e. tissue damage or bodily disorder
(Aydede 2009; Tye 2006).6 Consequently, we can posit a (at least necessary)
criterion for attributing the ability to conceive of pains as mental states by
investigating children’s skills to distinguish pains from the bodily disorders pains
may represent: If children manage to successfully distinguish pain experiences from
the bodily damage, then one might argue that those children pass an appearance-
reality task for bodily sensations. Whereas this would not be clear evidence that
children conceive of pains as mental states, it would at least indicate a more
sophisticated understanding of pains as being independent of bodily disturbances. If,
on the other hand, children think of pains as things or properties of objects in bodily
parts, then it can hardly be concluded that children possess a theory of mind in
regards to pains.
A survey of the literature reveals that there is no evidence that younger children
conceive of pains as distinct from the bodily disorders experiences of pains are
supposed to be independent from. In a large-scale study involving 680 school
children in Ireland, Gaffney and Dunne (1986) investigated how children between
the age of 5 and 14 think about pains, and conclude that 5–7 year-olds have ‘‘a view
of pain which is concrete, limited to certain locations in the body, perceptually
dominated [and] passive’’ (1986, p. 114). These results have been confirmed by
Esteve and Marquina-Aponte (2011) who surveyed the responses of 4–6 year olds
towards various questions about the nature of pain, and claim that these children
largely conceive of pain as a thing or a physical injury. Given this psychological
data and its coherence with standard experiments to test children’s understanding of
mental states, it seems that children can self-attribute pains as mental states no
sooner than sensory experiences or propositional attitudes. In contrast to the
introspectionist’s claim, the study by Esteve and Marquina-Aponte (2011) suggests
that children start to think of pains as partially independent of physical injuries not
before they are 8 years old.
So far I have closely connected the conditions that need to be fulfilled for making
introspective reports about sensory experiences with those for classifying pain
reports as introspective. This approach highlights the importance of the appearance-
6 Unfortunately, there is no consensus on what pains are supposed to represent. We can distinguish
descriptivists like Tye (1995) who maintain that pains represent a certain type of disorder in one’s body,
and evaluationists like Bain (2013) and Tye (2006) who claim that pains represent disturbances which are
in some sense bad for the person. In contrast to representationalists, imperativists (Klein 2007; Martı´nez
2011) argue that pains do not have indicative but rather imperative contents.
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reality distinction (and its related notions of privacy, subjectivity and hallucination)
and is inspired by the main protagonists of the debate. However, one may question
this approach and instead point towards statements of emotions like ‘I am sad’ or ‘I
am happy’. If these reports are introspective and also made by young children, then
claim (C) of the inconsistent triad is false.7 It would take us too far afield to discuss
young children’s ability to express emotions in greater detail. It seems, however,
that a plausible case can be made against classifying young children’s statements of
emotions as introspective reports. Alridge and Wood argue that academic research
findings often inflate children’s ability to report emotions. In a study involving 56
children, they show that ‘‘no 5-year old, nor the majority of 6- or 7-year-olds, could
[verbally] express fear, anger and anxiety’’ (1997, p. 1231). Instead, 5-year-olds use
the single word ‘happy’ to describe positive situations, and the single word ‘sad’ to
describe negative situations. Thus, the debate on whether claims of 3-year olds such
as ‘I am happy’ and ‘I am sad’ should be classified as introspective reports or merely
as responses elicited by positive or negative situations, is far from being settled.8
A similar objection can be made when considering statements of the form ‘I see
an x’, or ‘I hear y’: statements that children utter before they pass appearance-reality
tasks.9 These statements are sometimes classified as introspective statements
(Carruthers 2007; Nichols and Stich 2003). Whereas there might indeed be a notion
of seeing and hearing, the use of which indicates introspective awareness, the more
common notion of perception diverges from the one proposed by Carruthers and
Stich and Nichols. Child argues that ‘‘the concept of perception is the concept of a
way of finding out about an objective world, independent of us’’ (1994, p. 142, my
italics), and even Carruthers claims that ‘‘there is, indeed, a simpler concept of
seeing, grounded in the capacity to track eye-direction and line of sight. […] To say,
in this sense, that someone sees green is just to say that there is some green in the
line in which their eyes are pointed—no mental state needs to be attributed’’
(Carruthers 2007). Given the difficulties of children to pass appearance-reality tasks,
it is thus more plausible to assume that children use this simpler concept of seeing
before they have developed a theory of mind.
There is, however, an altogether different strategy for rejecting statement (C). A
long tradition in the philosophy of mind conceives of introspection in terms of an
inner sense model, e.g. Armstrong (1968), Lycan (1997). According to inner sense
theorists, people usually report mental states after having used a non-conceptual
sensory-like process. Advocates of process-based accounts of introspection claim
7 It might still be the case that pain reports of young children are not introspective and hence (A) false,
but whether pain reports are more similar to statements of emotion or more closely linked to statements
about sensory experiences, would require further investigation.
8 An anonymous reviewer for this journal noted that statements like ‘I am hungry’ or ‘I am thirsty’ are
also possible counterexamples to the claim that young children do not make introspective statements. The
strength of these counterexamples depends on whether they are rightly classified as introspective or
interoceptive. When used interoceptively, I take it that ‘‘I am hungry’’ merely refers to a state of my
stomach and not to a state of my mind. I do agree though that the same utterance might be used
introspectively (as has been argued by e.g. Shoemaker 1996, p. 211) and thus, refers to a mental state. It is
at least doubtful, however, that children use hunger or thirst reports introspectively before they have
learned the interoceptive use in order to demand food and liquid.
9 This objection was raised by another anonymous reviewer for this journal.
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that introspection resembles perception in certain respects, most importantly in that
the introspecting person can direct her focus to several aspects of her first-order
experience by introspectively attending to her sensory experiences. Applying this
alternative account of introspection to our discussion at hand, inner-sense theorists
can argue that all pain reports, also those made by young children, are introspective
reports because even young children use an introspective mechanism to report their
pains. Due to the lack of conceptual sophistication, these children might not yet
conceive of pains as subjective mental states. Nonetheless, those philosophers will
argue that we should classify all reports that are based on such an introspective
mechanism as introspective reports. Note, however, that this alternative account
would not constitute a possible response for most of the main protagonists of the
debate on the paradox of pain (e.g. Hill, Tye), because they conceive the non-
conceptual part of pain awareness to be a perceptual but not an introspective
process.
In order to evaluate this proposal, we need to get clearer on the relation between
the mechanism underlying the perception of bodily disorders in body parts and any
putative introspective mechanism. It seems that there are two ways in which the
introspective mechanism can be said to operate. First, one may argue that parts of
the pain mechanism that are usually identified as perceptual are actually
introspective: If correct, we should label a certain part of the mechanism
‘introspective’. Second, the introspective mechanism may operate on top of (and
causally after) the perceptual mechanism. I think that both positions have little to
speak in favor of them. The first version of the proposal leads at best to a verbal
dispute, i.e. whether we prefer to call attention to pains introspective or perceptual.
However, given that attention to pains is directed outwards towards body parts, and
more specifically to the location of pains, there seems to be no reason to re-label a
part of the perceptual system ‘introspective’.
A more promising view is the second version of the proposal. According to this
view, there is an introspective attention mechanism on top of the pain pathways that
makes us aware of pain experiences. While this account of introspection has still
several contemporary defenders (e.g. Gertler 2009; Lycan 1997; Schwitzgebel
2011), its popularity has somewhat decreased in course of the increased acceptance
of the transparency thesis (Harman 1990). This thesis states that in introspection
people’s attention slips right through their experiences. Accordingly, when a person
tries to introspect her pain experience, her attention will automatically focus on
qualities of the bodily disorder or bodily damage. Whether or not the transparency
thesis is true for pain experiences (see Aydede (manuscript) for a sceptical position),
the phenomenal datum that the transparency thesis rests on, is almost universally
accepted: the qualities that a person is aware of when she introspects an experience
of pain, will appear as qualitative properties of the bodily state. Thus, the claim that
experiences are transparent is often taken to be a decisive objection against process-
based accounts of introspection, as it seems to demonstrate that there is no
indication that such an introspective process occurs. It might be objected, however,
that the introspective mechanism, while not manifesting itself in people’s reports
and phenomenal experiences, is required to explain why more mature children and
adults conceive of pains as private, subjective mental states. This objection may
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sound odd, given that its advocates need to argue that young children do not yet
conceive of pains as mental states despite using an introspective mechanism because
they lack conceptual maturity. Thus, conceptual sophistication seems to be doing
the explanatory work and not the introspective mechanism. However, the objection
continues, the introspective mechanism enables conceptual maturity and is our best
explanation for why older children think of pains as mental states. Just as the
traditional sense modalities shape and refine our perceptual concepts, the
introspective sense modality shapes and refines our mental state concepts. At this
stage, the best way to deal with this objection against the developmental challenge,
is to provide alternative explanations that not only dispense with the postulation of
an introspective mechanism but can actually make predictions about people’s
development of concepts that can be empirically tested. This will be the task of the
next and last section of this paper.
4 How does the Paradox of Pain Arise?
In the previous two sections, I have raised (Sect. 2) and defended (Sect. 3) what I
call the developmental challenge. One of the two pillars of the paradox states that
(A) Genuine pain reports are introspective reports. However, combined with
(B) Young children make genuine pain reports, and (C) Young children do not make
introspective reports, we are faced with an inconsistent triad. My analysis of this
triad in the previous sections led me to argue that it is implausible to reject either
(B) or (C). Thus, to avoid the inconsistency, we need to drop (A), i.e. the
introspectionist view that all genuine pain reports are introspective reports. This
means that (i) the paradox of pain does not arise for young children, and that (ii) at a
minimum we need to refine and qualify the introspectionist view of pain.
If my challenge stands, then young children’s awareness of pain should be
characterized as fully perceptual, i.e. young children conceive of pains as bodily
states. We can now respond in three possible ways to this developmental challenge:
First, we can hold that an adult’s awareness of pain is also purely perceptual (and
the paradox as such dissolves). Second, one might believe that our awareness of
pain is ambiguous: whereas some pain reports are recognitional perceptual reports,
others are truly introspective statements. Third, we can maintain that a mature
awareness of pain is always introspective. Anyone who argues for either the second
or third option, i.e. the view that (some or all) pain reports become introspective
with advanced conceptual sophistication, the following important question arises:
which factors influence the transformation of a former perceptual report into an
introspective report? An obvious answer would be to highlight that children realize
at some stage in their development that pains are private, subjective states that
require an owner. Hardcastle, for example, claims that ‘‘certainly as children grow
and mature, their sense of what feeling pain is will change and become more precise
as their mnemonic, cognitive, and emotive capacities grow and mature as well’’
(2001, p. 194).
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Surprisingly though, there are hardly any investigations into how this transfor-
mation is supposed to take place.10 Compare this to the massive research
community that attempts to determine when and how children develop a theory
of mind for propositional attitudes and visual experiences. In this last section, I
discuss three factors that, so I argue, have an important impact on how people’s
concept of pain develops. I believe that further progress in our understanding of
people’s concept of pain can be expected from studying these three factors.
Arguably the most important factor that shapes the development of the concept of
pain in a child is the constraint that every human body is connected only to a single
mind/brain, hereafter called one body—one mind constraint. This constraint is only
violated in conjoined twins who are extremely rare and often die within the first few
months of their lives. Whereas visual properties of body surfaces are in principle
publicly accessible, properties of interior states of the body, including certain
properties of the skin, are naturally accessible through nerve signals that are
connected to a single mind only. Modern technologies like x-ray and ultrasonog-
raphy now provide ways to access interior states of the body. However, in normal
circumstances—circumstances that determine the way we use ordinary concepts—
people have no direct access to other people’s interior states of the body.
Importantly, it seems that several properties that are often claimed to be evidence
that the concept pain is a mental concept, develop because of the one body—one
mind constraint:
Privacy: There can be little doubt that for most people pains are private.
However, the private nature of pains might only be a contingent matter—dependent
on the fact that each person has exclusive direct access to her own body. The case of
conjoined twins provides a test bed for the status of the privacy of pains. Thus, one
might argue that a pain that seems to occur in a shared body part is felt by both
twins, and is thus a public object for the community of the twins.
Incorrigibility: Given that in most cases people have no direct access to the
pains of other people, they have no basis for, and hence never correct other people’s
pain reports. Whatever the person reports about her pain gains the status of being
incorrigible. Medical practitioners might of course interrogate patients about their
pains in a way that seems to suggest that they have better knowledge of a person’s
pain than the pain-patient herself. However, the ultimate authority about her pain
remains (or at least should remain) with the pain-patient (Sullivan 2003).
Certainty: A direct consequence of the lack of any disagreement with a person’s
pain report is that people consider their access to their own pains to be highly
reliable. Thus, pain reports are considered to be certain.
Subjectivity: Given that people consider the access to their pains highly reliable,
there is no reason for them to posit the existence of pains, if they cannot feel any
pains. Pains are considered subjective states that require an owner.
The one body—one mind constraint is thus likely to be largely responsible for the
plausibility of the introspectionist view of pain. Note, however, that people’s
10 The articles by Gaffney and Dunne (1986) and Esteve and Marquina-Aponte (2011) describe different
stages in the development of children’s understanding of the concept pain, but these stages only allow for
very limited conclusions about when ‘mental’ aspects enter into children’s understanding of pain.
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concept of pain would be shaped in the way I have sketched above, even if pains are
bodily and not mental entities: People do have private access not only to their
mental states but also to bodily states, and the incorrigibility and certainty of pain
reports may mislead many people to think of pains as subjective states. Thus,
investigating the features that clearly signify pains to be mental states, is a difficult
endeavor. One way to disengage necessary mental from contingent bodily privacy,
however, would be to determine whether conjoined twins have a concept of pain
that diverges from other people’s concept in its introspective characteristics. Due to
the rare occurrence of conjoined twins, however, other empirical investigatory
means may be necessary, e.g. manipulating people’s visual body image in virtual
realities in which people share certain body parts with other people, or directly
asking people to imagine sharing body parts with others (Sytsma 2010). In (Sect.
3.2), I have argued that we should only posit an introspective attention mechanism if
no other explanations are in sight. The existence and likely importance of the ‘one
body—one mind’ constraint seems to be a much more plausible candidate to explain
the conceptual role of pain.
If the one body—one mind constraint is largely responsible for the way we think
about pains, then concepts of other bodily sensations should be similarly governed
by that constraint.11 We have to distinguish, however, intransitive sensations like
itches and tickles from transitive sensations like sensations of warmth, pressure, and
proprioceptive states. All these sensations essentially involve the body, but only
intransitive bodily sensations like itches and tickles provide us with information
about states that are accessible only to a single mind. In contrast, the warmth of
external objects and the pressure they exert on body parts is publicly accessible.
Similarly, while proprioceptive sensations are accessible only to a single mind, the
objects that these sensations inform us about, namely the position and movement of
one’s body, can be verified or falsified from a third-person point of view. Hence, it
is not surprising that the appearance-reality distinction can be successfully applied
to objects and qualities, about which thermoception and proprioception inform us,
e.g. ‘It feels warm but it is not warm’, ‘it appears as if my hand is moving, but it is
not moving’.
A second reason for why people believe pains to be mental states can be found in
language-specific linguistic expressions and ‘language games’. I briefly discuss two
examples to illustrate this point. First, when people have strong or enduring pains in
a certain body part, they often take painkillers to stop the body part from hurting.
The English word ‘painkiller’ literally means that the pill kills the pain itself, and
not merely the experience of pain, even if this might not be a proper description of
what happens anatomically. In fact, analgesics, in contrast to anaesthetics, do not
prevent nerve signals from bodily disorders to reach the affective and somatosen-
soric parts of the brain, but act centrally in the brain. Our understanding of
painkillers furthermore seems to support the view that when the feeling of pain
ceases due to the effect of painkillers, the pain itself is gone (Aydede 2006b). This
language game is not universal though. In the German language, painkillers are
called ‘schmerzstillende Mittel’ which can be translated as pain-silencing
11 I thank two reviewers for this journal who have both raised this issue.
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appliances, suggesting that the pain does not vanish but rather continues to exist
without ‘being vocal’.12 Whether or not native Germans consider pains to stop when
they take a ‘pain-silencing pill’ is certainly an interesting question that deserves
further investigation. Second, the English phrase ‘I am in pain’ is idiosyncratic and
does not have equivalent expressions in any other language that I have looked
into.13 Interestingly, the phrase ‘being in pain’ does not attribute a pain to a body
part but rather to a person (see e.g. Bain 2007), and hereby resembles ascriptions of
states of emotions, cp. ‘I am sad’. This expression is also semantically impoverished
in that it cannot be further specified where a pain is felt, e.g. it is semantically
incoherent to claim ‘I am in throbbing ankle-pain’. Arguably, the widespread and
very frequent use of the phrase ‘I am in pain’ encourages people to think that
emotions and bodily sensations have more in common than they might actually
have, whereas in other languages, e.g. Spanish, French and Italian, a relational view
between people and pains may be preferred. These example suggest that the
inferential aspects of the concept of pain may depend on properties of the language
in which the concept is embedded. In order to investigate this possibility, cross-
cultural studies should be conducted that can reveal whether perceptual and
introspective characteristics of our awareness of pain are shaped by cultural and
linguistic circumstances.
A third source for older children’s more sophisticated reasoning abilities about
pains may be found in their advanced knowledge of other mental states by the age of
six. At this age, children pass appearance-reality and false-belief tasks, indicating
that they understand that mental states are representational—the arguably most
important aspect of the mind. The study by Esteve et al. (2011) demonstrates that
children conceive of pains as partially independent of physical injuries a few years
after they pass false-belief tasks. Thus, it might well be the case that gaining
knowledge about propositional attitudes and visual experiences fosters a more
sophisticated understanding of pains—perhaps as mental states.14 The dual
component view of pain experiences, according to which pains have both sensory
and affective elements, makes it not only more difficult for children to grasp the
nature of pains, but makes it also more complicated to test children’s conceptual
abilities. Nonetheless, whereas established tasks exist to test children’s abilities to
reason about false beliefs and appearances in the traditional sense modalities,
similar experiments for pains and other bodily sensations are currently lacking. Such
12 As a reviewer of this article has correctly pointed out, ‘‘schmerzstillende Mittel’’ is only one of two
common translations of the English word ‘‘painkiller’’. The other is ‘‘Schmerzmittel’’. However, the term
‘‘Schmerzmittel’’ is silent about whether it is the pain or the pain experience that gets removed by the
drug.
13 An inquiry into 13 other, mostly European languages revealed that speakers of these languages have
no equivalent expression to the English phrase ‘being in pain’. People who speak these languages rather
use expressions that are equivalent to ‘having pain’, ‘feeling pain’, ‘it hurts’, and ‘it aches’. Thus, the
‘being in pain’-phrase seems to be largely an idiosyncrasy of the English language. It therefore seems
advisable to analyze the structure of the concept pain using expressions of pain that apply to other
languages as well.
14 The reverse claim, i.e. the possibility that children’s understanding of other mental states is strongly
influenced by children’s awareness of pain, should not be excluded, however.
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experiments are urgently needed to detail the conceptual abilities of children in the
domain of bodily sensations.
I have argued that if the developmental challenge succeeds, then young
children’s pain reports need to be classified as perceptual. In order to understand
why the common-sense conception of pain suggests pain reports to be introspective,
we need to investigate the various factors and contexts that shape the concept of
pain in children and adults. In this section I have listed and discussed three factors
that may influence the way we think and talk about pains. Importantly, none of these
factors rules out the view that the common-sense conception about pains is
mistaken. E.g., the privacy of pains may be merely contingent due to the one
body—one mind constraint, which may also leads us to falsely believe that pains are
subjective states. I do not maintain, however, that a determinate answer can be given
without further empirical studies. The outcome of my discussion is consistent with
the view that at least the majority of pain reports are not introspective but rather
perceptual reports. Our concept of pain might not be paradoxical after all.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I raised what I call the developmental challenge to the paradox of pain.
This challenge attempts to dissolve the paradox by disputing the introspectionist
view of pain (A). I have shown that the introspectionist view is constitutive of an
inconsistent triad: (A) Genuine pain reports are introspective reports, (B) Young
children make genuine pain reports, (C) Young children do not make introspective
reports. By analyzing results from several developmental studies and by considering
the possession conditions for the concept pain, I argued that we can neither reject
that children make genuine pain reports (B), nor does it seem plausible to deny that
young children do not make introspective reports (C). Consequently, I concluded
that the introspectionist view (A) is not a generally valid claim, and that the paradox
of pain does not hold for young children. My solution to the developmental
challenge requires that we start to look for explanations of how the putative paradox
of pain may arise during cognitive development. In order to make progress on how
the concept of pain works, I have suggested to (i) determine the importance of the
‘one body—one mind’ constraint for the development of the concept pain, (ii)
investigate how this development is shaped by the linguistic communities of
speakers in which children grow up, and (iii) study how children develop the
concept of pain in relation to the development of metacognitive abilities in other
domains.
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